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Risk
We'll take the house. Honey, the chances of another plane hitting this house are 
astronomical. It's been pre-disastered. We're going to be safe here.
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From:  The World According to Garp, Warner Bros., 1982
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• What is Risk?
• Risk Terms in NASA
• Why Do We Worry About Risk?
• Risk vs. Possibility 
• Balanced Risk
• Perspectives of Risk (Stakeholder, Developer)
• Risk as a Development Tool
• Acceptance of Risk at Different Levels and Times
• Risk Classification
• What is Risk-based SMA?
• Ugly vs. Risky
• Risks of Conformance and Nonconformance
Agenda
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• Definition: the combination of 
– a) the probability (qualitative or quantitative) that an undesired event will 
occur, and
– b) the consequence or impact of the undesired event
– In short, risk is an expectation of loss in statistical terms
• Flavors of risk (consequences)
– Technical (failure or performance degradation on-orbit)
– Cost ($ it will take to fix the problem)
– Schedule (time to fix the problem)
– Safety (injury, death, or collateral damage)
What is Risk?
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Context
• Structured risk statement
• Likelihood
• Consequence
Anatomy of a Risk
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Concern
Statistics
Impact/Criticality
Uncertainty
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• Risk is the common communication language between all of the 
technical and nontechnical disciplines in a project
Risk as a Common Language
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Schedulers
RISK
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Systems 
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• Baseline risk: the normal level of risk in developing and assembling 
a product
– This can be considered as risk that is accepted by a project at initiation 
without further tracking or debate
– Generally we do not track risks within the baseline
– Experienced developers mitigate baseline risks through standard 
processes
• Credible risk: risk having likelihood category of at least “1” on the 
pertinent risk scale (note that in GSFC’s risk scale there are 
5 categories and 1 is the lowest risk category)
– There are an infinite number of risks that are not credible 
for any project
Risk Terms in NASA
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• Accept:  Determine that the consequences of an identified risk, should 
they occur, are acceptable without further mitigation.
• Close: Determine that a risk is no longer credible and tracking may be 
discontinued
• Residual Risk:  the remaining risk that exists after all mitigation 
actions have been implemented and/or exhausted in accordance with 
the RM process.  Residual risks are often technical risks that are 
accepted at the time of launch.  Often the term is used when an effort 
is complete to resolve a failure, anomaly, or nonconformance when 
resources are not available to completely resolve the concern or 
requirements shortfall. 
Risk Terms in NASA (cont’d)
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• We don’t want bad things to happen
• The only way to avoid risk is to avoid doing anything
• Understanding risk is key to engineering the system
– Establishing requirements
– Responding to undesired or 
unexpected events
– Choosing between different 
options
• Communicating risk is key to 
portraying the status of a 
project in development
Why Do We Worry About Risk?
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Proton Failure
Photo: Tsenki TV Webcast
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• Failure modes and mechanisms can appear through
– Analysis and simulation
– Observation
– Prior experiences 
– Brainstorming “what if” scenarios
– Speculation
• These all constitute possibilities
• There is a tendency to take action to eliminate severe 
consequences regardless of the probability of occurrence
• When a possibility is combined with an environment, an operating 
regime, and supporting data, a risk can be established—this is core to 
the engineering process
• Lack of careful and reasoned analysis of each possibility in terms of the 
conditions that results in the consequence and the probability of 
occurrence will result in excessive cost and may increase the overall risk
Risk vs. Possibility
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Balanced Risk
(maintaining a level waterbed)
• A systems approach of looking across all options to ensure that 
mitigating or eliminating a particular risk does not cause much greater 
risk somewhere in the system
11
Try to maintain the level waterbed
Pushing too hard on individual risks can cause other risks to be inordinately high
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• General safety requirements dictate that anything considered "safety" 
requires 3 inhibits.
• Unfortunately, many elements prior to launch vehicle separation that are 
tied solely to mission success are put under the safety umbrella.  
• This means that by default, many items such as premature deployment of 
solar arrays or other appendages are 
considered a safety issue for the on-orbit 
portion, even if they have no range safety 
effect, and they prompt a decision that it is 
always better to have more inhibits even if 
such a design prompts an even greater risk 
of mission failure due to one of the inhibits 
not releasing.  
• Ultimately, under the guise of “safety” we 
may end up with a less reliable system that 
is not more safe if we are not diligent with 
system-level thinking
Unbalanced Risk Example
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Reliability 
with 3 inhibits
Reliability
without 3 inhibits
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• Each of two or more sides has a perspective, philosophy, or, in the 
worst case principle
• All are conflicting, and generally based on past experience in 
some context
• The heels dig in, and personalities take over
• It’s time to frame the risk on both sides of each perspective
A common occurrence:  The Battle of 
Wills
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Perspectives of Risk—What Attributes 
are Used to Paint the Risk Picture?
• Well-established requirements and 
processes followed
• Assessment from independent 
review team
• Project risks presented
• Problem records
• Waivers
• Experiences in integration and test
• Project risks tracked
• Team internal dynamics and confidence
• PI/PM/systems engineer confidence
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Stakeholder Developer
What do you mean you’re not following the 
NASA Lifting Standard?
We know how to do this—we’ve done it before.
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• The primary stakeholder(s) (MDAA, Center Director, NOAA, user 
community, etc.) accept(s) risks for project mission success
• Risk acceptance is delegated to the project to manage real-time, 
day-to-day development
– Stakeholder has right of refusal through risk communication
• Safety and Mission Assurance ensures the risks are properly 
captured and communicated 
• Many risks based on programmatic concerns are accepted from 
day one
• Most technical risks need not be accepted until launch 
– Many risks involve items that are buried into a system or core to the system 
design such that removal will be very painful and are for all intents and 
purposes accepted early on
• Programmatic risks based on technical concerns that have not been fully 
mitigated will frequently become technical risks, i.e., there may be a 
latent defect that survived through I&T
Risk Acceptance at 
Different Levels and Times
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• Establishment of the level of risk tolerance from the stakeholder, with 
some independence from the cost
– Cost is covered through NPR 7120.5 Categories
• If we were to try to quantify the risk classification, it would be based on a 
ratio of programmatic risk tolerance to technical risk tolerance. 
– For Class A, we take on enormous levels of programmatic risk in order to make 
technical risk as close to 0 as possible. The assumption is that there are many 
options for trades and the fact is that there must be tolerance for overruns.  
– For Class D, there will be minimal tolerance for overruns and a greater need to 
be competitive, so there is a much smaller programmatic risk “commodity” to 
bring to the table.
• The reality is that the differences between different classifications are 
more psychological (individual thoughts) and cultural (longstanding team 
beliefs and practices) than quantitative.
• There is one technical requirement from HQ associated with risk 
classification: single point failures on Class A missions require waiver.
• There will be changes in the new NPR 8705.4
What is Risk Classification?
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• Class A: Lowest risk posture by design  
– Failure would have extreme consequences to public safety or high priority national science 
objectives.  
– In some cases, the extreme complexity and magnitude of development will result in a system 
launching with many low to medium risks based on problems and anomalies that could not be 
completely resolved under cost and schedule constraints.
– Examples: HST and JWST
• Class B: Low risk posture by design
– Represents a high priority National asset whose loss would constitute a high impact to public 
safety or national science objectives
– Examples: GOES-R, TDRS-K/L/M, MAVEN, JPSS, and OSIRIS-REX
• Class C: Moderate risk posture by design
– Represents an instrument or spacecraft whose loss would result in a loss or delay of some key 
national
science objectives.
– Examples: LRO, MMS, TESS, and ICON
• Class D: Cost/schedule are equal or greater considerations compared to mission 
success risks
– Technical risk is medium by design (may be dominated by yellow risks).  
– Many credible mission failure mechanisms may exist. A failure to meet Level 1 requirements prior 
to minimum lifetime would be treated as a mishap.
– Examples: LADEE, IRIS, NICER, and DSCOVR
Risk Classification—(NPR 7120.5 Projects)
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• NPR 7120.8 “class”—Technical risk tolerance is high 
– Some level of failure at the project level is expected; but at a higher level (e.g., program 
level), there would normally be an acceptable failure rate of individual projects, such 
as 15%.   
– Life expectancy is generally very short, although instances of opportunities in space with 
longer desired lifetimes are appearing.  
– Failure of an individual project prior to mission lifetime is considered as an accepted risk 
and would not constitute a mishap. (Example: ISS-CREAM)
• “Do No Harm” Projects—If not governed by NPR 7120.5 or 7120.8, we 
classify these as “Do No Harm”, unless another requirements document is 
specified 
– Allowable technical risk is very high.  
– There are no requirements to last any amount of time, only a requirement not to harm the host 
platform (ISS, host spacecraft, etc.).  
– No mishap would be declared if the payload doesn’t function. Note: Some payloads that may be self-
described as Class D actually belong in this category. (Example: CATS, RRM)
Risk Classification—(Non-NPR 7120.5 Projects)
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7120.8 and “Do No Harm” Projects are not Class D
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The process of applying limited resources to maximize the chance for 
safety & mission success by focusing on mitigating specific risks that 
are applicable to the project vs. simply enforcing a set of requirements 
because they have always worked
What is Risk-Based SMA?
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Risk-based SMA is now GSFC policy—GPR 8705.4
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• Early discussions with developer on their criteria and approaches for ensuring mission success 
(e.g., use of high-quality parts for critical items and lower grade parts where design is fault-tolerant) 
and responsiveness to feedback
• Upfront assessment of design, operations, reliability and risk, e.g. tall poles, to prioritize how 
resources and requirements will be applied
• Judicious application of requirements based on learning from previous projects, the results from 
the reliability/risk assessment, and the operating environment (Lessons Learned—multiple sources, 
Cross-cutting risk assessments etc.)
• Continuous assessment of risks (safety, technical, and programmatic together to assure all factors 
are considered) to design performance, availability, manufacturability, operations/testing, and 
robustness in response to testing, revision, rusk mitigations, and remediation.
• Characterization of risk for nonconforming items to determine suitability for use—project makes 
determination whether to accept, not accept, or mitigate risks based on consideration of all risks
• Continuous review of requirements for suitability based on current processes, technologies, and 
recent experiences
• Consideration of the risk of implementing a requirement and the risk of not implementing 
the requirement. 
Attributes of Risk-Based SMA
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Note: Always determine the cause before making repeated attempts to 
produce a product after failures or nonconformances
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Ugly vs. Risky—
Does Ugliness = Riskiness?
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From:  J. Plante, NSC Quality Engineering Seminar on Workmanship Standards., 2011
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• Were requirements imposed based on an understanding of the risks 
within a project?
• What are the risks associated with the enforcement of requirements?
• What is the risk associated with a particular nonconformance?  
• Should we immediately assume that a nonconforming item is risky for 
the application? 
• In many cases there is a good reason why a product is nonconforming
Risk of Conformance vs. 
Risk of Nonconformance 
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Do not reject a nonconforming item without understanding the risk.
Determine the cause of NC before reproducing the item.
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• Risk is a central element of space system development 
• Understanding of risk is key to effectively engineering the system
• This understanding is used to prioritize resources in development and 
to convey the status to the project stakeholders
• Confusion between severity of consequence, scenarios, probability 
and relationship to other categories (safety, technical, and pro-
grammatic) can lead to unnecessarily high costs, unbalanced risk, 
and an overall higher risk posture for a project.
Summary
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• Link to GSFC Risk Assessment handbook: 
https://standards.nasa.gov/center-specific-standards
– Then select GSFC-HDBK-8005
• Link to download GPR 8705.4: 
https://elibrary.gsfc.nasa.gov/_assets/doclibBidder/tech_docs/G
PR%208705.4-Signed%20Copy%20-%20Copy.pdf
• Link to download Risk-based Safety and Mission 
Assurance article in Quality Engineering:  
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08982112.2018.14
73584
• Contact Info:
– Jesse Leitner: jesse.leitner@nasa.gov
Additional Information 
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Backups to Draw From
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Risk as a Development Tool
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Preliminary Risk 
Assessment
Product 
Development and 
Deployment
Project Risk 
Database
Project 
Communication 
to Stakeholders
Requirements 
Development
Risk Identification
Prioritization of 
Resources
ATP/Resource 
Allocation
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• Stepping from A, B, … “Do No Harm” results in:
– More control of development activities at lower levels; people actually doing 
the work
– Less control by people who are removed from the development process
– Less burden by requirements that may not affect the actual risks for 
the project
– More engineering judgment required 
– Less formal documentation (does not relax need to capture risks nor does it 
indicate that processes should be blindly discarded)
– Greater understanding required for reliability and risk areas to ensure that 
requirements are properly focused, risk is balanced to enable effective use 
of limited resources, and that good engineering decisions are made in 
response to events that occur in development
– Emphasis on Testing/Test results to get desired operational confidence 
– Greater sensitivity to decisions made on the floor
Risk Classification Trends
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• What is Class D? = Highest risk posture for missions governed 
by NPR 7120.5
• What is Class D not?—A catch-all for projects that are not 
NPR 7120.5 Classes A-C 
• Is there a problem unique to Class D at GSFC?
– No
• There is an unbalanced approach to risk that affects Class D more than others
• There is a lack of definition of how key processes for mitigating risk vary across 
all risk classifications
• These problems even affect Class A
• GSFC Class D Constitution addresses some of the programmatic 
processes such as management structure, waivers, etc.
• GPR 8705.4 effort and new organizational structure addresses the 
technical processes
• Organizational changes in 300 will provide the infrastructure 
for implementation
– Implementation has already begun
Class D at GSFC
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• Do:
– Streamline processes (less formal documentation, e.g., spreadsheet vs. formal 
software system for waivers, etc.)
– Focus on tall poles and critical items from a focused reliability analysis
– Tolerate more risk than A, B, or C (particularly schedule risk)
– Capture and communicate risks diligently
– Rely more on knowledge than requirements
– Put more authority in the hands of PMs and PIs
– Have significant margin on mass, volume, power (not always possible, but 
strongly desirable)
– Have significant flexibility on performance requirements (not always possible, 
but strongly desirable)
• Don’t:
– Ignore risks!
– Reduce reliability efforts (but do be more focused and less formal)
– Assume nonconforming means unacceptable or risky
– Blindly eliminate processes
Class D (and below)—Dos & Don’ts
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Risk can be characterized by number of defects that affect performance or reliability
and the impact of each. Defects are generally of design or workmanship. 
Note: A thorough environmental test program will ensure most risks are programmatic (cost/schedule) until very late, when time and money run out.
Defects vs Mission Success
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Generally-representative example, prioritization may vary by mission attributes 
or personal preference or experience.
Mission Success Activities
C
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• Nonconformance handling
– Is the requirement that is not met important for the current project in 
its environment?
– Is the nonconforming item critical?
– What is the risk for this project of the nonconformance?
• Cost/schedule
• Technical
• Work orders and procedures
• Anomaly resolution
– Documentation
– Root cause analysis
– Lessons learned for same project or others
Other Activities With Cost & Risk 
Reduction Implications
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Cost vs Time to eliminate a defect
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Removing layers results in some defects not being caught, and some being caught later.
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The more layers that are removed, the later defects are likely to be caught 
(if they are caught), the more work that has to be “undone”, the more testing 
that has to be redone, and the more likely the project is to suffer severe 
programmatic impact and/or to fly with added residual risk.  
Time at which defect is caught Launch 
date
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• GSFC implementation of NPR 8705.4
• Establishment of Risk-based SMA as policy for GSFC
• Risk Classification Definitions
• Nonconformance handling
– Do not reject without understanding the risk
– Determine cause of NC before reproducing the item 
(even from different vendor)
• Guidelines for activities vs mission class
• Ultimately will be one element used to develop project Mission 
Assurance Requirements vs mission class
• How does a project demonstrate that they are developing a 
Class “X” product?
• How do we convey to a vendor what we expect for Class “X”?
GPR 8705.4
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• Class A missions can have Class D elements
– Non-critical
– Highly redundant
– Deliveries with acceptable “defects”
• Class D mission can have Class A elements
– Critical elements
– Only available 
– Spares from other projects
Risk Classification—All Levels
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Science Mission 
(NPR 7120.5)
Research/Technology 
(NPR 7120.8)
Do No Harm
• Cost > = mission 
success
• Schedule flexible 
(low priority)
• ~6 mo.–2 yr. life
• Project failure = 
mishap
• Medium technical risks 
(may fly with many 
yellow risks)
• Very low cost 
individual projects
• Schedule flexible 
(low priority)
• High technical risk
• Very short lifetime 
(< ~3 months)
• Success is determined 
over multiple projects, 
e.g., 85% success over 
one year’s worth
• Project failure is not 
a mishap
• Only requirement—do 
no harm to personnel 
or other property 
(e.g. ISS)
• Schedule flexible 
(low priority)
• Very high technical risk
• Lifetime is best effort
• Project failure is not 
a mishap
Class D (and below) Categories
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• Simple design (few critical elements)
• Short mission life
• Clear and static science objectives and goals
– Sufficient, but not overreaching
• Robust design (tolerant to variance in workmanship)
• Stable and repeatable manufacturing processes (with known 
process variances)
• High Margins (to allow more design flexibility)
– Mass
– Power
– Volume
– Specifications:  Dimensions, Materials 
• Prior flight experience (with critical components in the 
same environment)
Best Applicability of a Streamlined 
Class D Approach
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• GSFC directives and standards (more detail in backup)
– A dozen or so GPRs, Center wide PGs and standards for workmanship, 
environmental test, and GOLD rules
– Mostly handled by common practices
– Risk classification is not handled well for those that have significant impact
– Software requirements are the biggest burden, without particular basis 
in risk
• NASA directives and standards
– Numerous NPRs, NPDs, and standards
– Similar statement to above applies
• Engineering resource budgeting—not closely tuned to 
streamlined implementation
Center Challenges and Perceived Challenges 
for Low Cost Implementation In-house at GSFC
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The GSFC Quality Triangle
39
Commodity Risk Assessment
• Risk based usage guidelines
• Risk layering requirements per risk class
• Nonconforming and out-of-family item risk assessment
• Learning through risk assessments, research, 
and testing
Quality Engineering
• Upfront involvement in design
• Design for manufacturability
• Assurance of process engineering and qualified processes
• SME support for supply chain management
• Inspection
• Nonconformance and problem identification in 
developed hardware/software
Management Systems
• ISO and AS9100 quality
• NCR follow-ups with vendors
• Audits and assessments
• Supply Chain Management
• Lessons learned capture
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Commodity: Tangible or intangible entity that has a major impact on risk, 
cost or schedule for GSFC projects
• Expert in key discipline area with background and experience with reliability 
and risk
• Responsible and empowered to assign risks based on warnings, alerts, environments, 
and “what we are stuck with”
• Establishes testing programs and protocols to keep up with current design practices 
and common parts and components
• Sets the policies for the risk-based decisions on use of parts, components, 
and processes 
• Establishes layers of risk reduction based on risk classification 
(ownership of GPR 8705.4)
• Determines the acceptability and risk of alternate standards or requirements, 
or deviations and non-conformances
• Answers, “are we okay?”, “why are we okay?”, “how okay are we?”
• Provides risk assessment to the project for the project to decide how they 
want to disposition
CRAE: Commodity Risk 
Assessment Engineer
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• Standard Spacecraft Components
• Printed Circuit Boards
• Digital Electronics (especially FPGAs and ASICs)
• Power Systems
• Capacitors/inductors
• Transistors
• Resistors
• Hybrid microcircuits
• Optocouplers
• On-board processors
• Workmanship/Printed Wiring Assemblies/Packaging/Components
• Software
• Materials
• Radiation
• Environmental testing
• Contamination
• Connectors
• ESD
Commodity Areas
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